Creation and Transfer of Knowledge: Institutions and - download pdf or read online

By Giorgio Barba Navaretti, Partha Dasgupta, Karl-Göran Mäler, Domenico Siniscalco

ISBN-10: 3642084087

ISBN-13: 9783642084089

ISBN-10: 3662037386

ISBN-13: 9783662037386

Is wisdom an fiscal reliable? that are the features of the associations regulating the creation and diffusion of information? Cumulation of information is a key determinant of financial progress, yet just recently wisdom has moved to the middle of financial research. contemporary literature additionally provides profound insights into occasions like medical growth, creative and craft improvement that have been hardly addressed as socio-economic associations, being the area of sociologists and historians instead of economists. This quantity adopts a multidisciplinary method of deliver wisdom within the concentration of consciousness, as a key financial issue.

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Giorgio Barba Navaretti, Partha Dasgupta, Karl-Göran Mäler,'s Creation and Transfer of Knowledge: Institutions and PDF

Is wisdom an financial sturdy? that are the features of the associations regulating the construction and diffusion of data? Cumulation of information is a key determinant of monetary progress, yet only in the near past wisdom has moved to the middle of monetary research. fresh literature additionally provides profound insights into occasions like medical growth, creative and craft improvement which were infrequently addressed as socio-economic associations, being the area of sociologists and historians instead of economists.

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Sample text

Show that (for risk neutral finns) it is possible to design incentive schemes which deli ver first best knowledge disclosure and R&D effort. According to this scheme, the leading finn is always allowed to keep the full benefits fonn the innovation, if it is the winner of the R&D race. If lagging fums win, they will be allowed to use the innovation, following the payment of a fee to the leading finn. This result shows that with asymmetrie endowments of knowledge and when co-operation is restricted to knowledge sharing (and not extended to R&D effort), it is possible to implement efficient arm-Iength R&D contracts.

37 to the transferring contracts in Etbier and Wright and exogenous in the other two models. Etbier and Wright are rather sirnilar in their structure and major assumptions (although the former is a general equilibrium model). The outcome of research is uncertain : R&D effort increases the probability of developing a low cost technology. Uncertainty creates asymmetric information, and consequently moral hazard in the technology transfer: the transferee cannot observe R&D effort and the transferor does not want to reveal its research effort, as it would disclose proprietary knowledge.

As we have discussed above, arm length R&D contracts are not likely to emerge when the technologieal asymmetry between firms is exceedingly large. This result can intuitively be extended at a country level. If the level of loeal technologieal knowledge (embodied in human capital, infrastructure, dynarnism of local firms) is exceedingly low, the cost of carrying out R&D locally may be too high. A second issue is whether specialised rather than diffused technological knowledge is more likely to attract R&D.

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Creation and Transfer of Knowledge: Institutions and Incentives by Giorgio Barba Navaretti, Partha Dasgupta, Karl-Göran Mäler, Domenico Siniscalco


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