By Kenneth A. Schultz
Schultz explores the consequences of democratic politics on coercive international relations. He argues that open political festival among executive and competition events impacts threats in overseas crises, how rival states interpret these threats, and even if crises should be settled wanting conflict. in comparison to their nondemocratic opposite numbers, democracies make threats extra selectively, yet these they do make usually tend to be successful--that is, to realize a positive final result with no conflict. Schultz makes use of game-theoretic types and assessments the ensuing speculation utilizing either statistical analyses and ancient case reports.
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Additional resources for Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy
Together, these insights suggest that arguments about democracy and war that focus purely on how institutions or norms shape leaders’ preferences for war and peace are at best incomplete and at worst indeterminate. They are incomplete to the extent that they assume a shared preference for peace is sufficient to explain a peaceful outcome. In fact, such preferences are necessary but not sufficient to explain the absence of war. Such arguments may also be indeterminate to the extent that the relationship between preferences and outcomes is itself indeterminate when states interact with incomplete information.
But when it comes to national security and the need to defend the national interest in a dangerous world, the answer is less obvious. Are transparency and informative competition in the national interest? 20 Part I Theory 2 Information and signaling in international crises The natural starting point for an inquiry into the effects of democracy on war is some consideration of the factors that cause international disputes to become crises and crises to escalate into wars. A fully specified theory of war is, of course, well beyond the reach of a single book, much less a single chapter.
From the perspective of the target, war is the worst possible outcome. While the status quo allocation is clearly better than making concessions of magnitude p, the latter is still preferable to fighting a war. The challenger also prefers concessions to war – and all other outcomes, for that matter. How the challenger evaluates war relative to the remaining outcome depends upon the actual values of p and cc. Of particular importance in what follows is whether or not the challenger prefers war to backing down – that is whether wc is greater than or less than Ϫa.
Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy by Kenneth A. Schultz